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However, beyond passion there is reason. And reason clearly tells us that the fears linked to globalization are unjustified. In order to be convinced, one has only to accept a little effort towards abstraction, which is the only way by which we may understand reality. In fact, it is enough to understand the main statement from the theory of exchange -what we later call the exchange principle -and its extension to the field of international trade. What we have to learn from the general theory of exchange is absolutely clear and it can be considered as an eternal and universal truth. We are told that, all individuals being different, being endowed with various talents and capacities, each of them finds his own interest -at least if he acts according to what his reason claims -in specializing in the activity (or the activities) in which he is relatively more efficient (in comparison with other potential producers). We may also add a consideration which is not linked to the logics of action, but to the mere observation of facts, namely that, whenever people specialize in one given activity, they learn and discover more efficient ways to produce, so that exchange thus brings a possible additional gain.
What is true for one individual remains true for several individuals, for instance those who constitute a country 4 . Without having to ask them, one can be certain that exchange is profitable for those who do it, at least if it is freely decided : If two persons decide to trade together, although they are not obliged to exchange, it is necessarily because each of them find that exchange is profitable for them. But there is no reason for the gains of trade to disappear whenever trade takes place between two individuals (or two groups of individuals, for instance two firms) located in different national areas. This is why one can say without any doubt that globalization is necessarily profitable. Now, if the case seems so clear, one may wonder why globalization is opposed so forcefully, as well by the supporters of the anti-globalization movements as by many producers, politicians or journalists.
In the present paper we will try to trace out what seems to us the fundamental roots of the opposition to free exchange (section I), which will allow us to criticize some of 4 A country can be defined not as a specific area, but as a specific set of individuals who are using the same system of laws, rules and rights. 4 4 the most usual arguments against free exchange (section II). We then stress that disagreements about free exchange and globalization are not mainly based on technical aspects of the problem, but on (often implicit) ethical arguments (section III). As a consequence we will address the possible strategy to counter opposition to free exchange (section IV).
I-The roots of the intellectual error concerning international exchange
As we just mentioned, the field of international trade and trade policy offers a unique paradox : Although the merits of free trade -and more generally of free movements of activities, goods and factors of production -have been forcefully demonstrated for at least two centuries, although they correspond to an undebatable principle, an innumerable number of people and governments are still supporting limits to free exchange and believe -or seem to believe -that restrictions to trade are justified.
Moreover, it is surprising that millions of people have learnt the principle of comparative advantage in schools and Universities, but they seem not to be able to use it whenever they have to evaluate a concrete problem related with international trade. For instance, they usually believe that all producers in a country would suffer from a loss of so-called "competitiveness" if ever the VAT was higher in their country and exports were not tax-free. They do not understand that "competitiveness" is a relative concept and not an absolute concept, so that an activity in a country seems to be competitive only to the extent that other activities are not. Therefore, if ever the VAT was not reimbursed on exported products, the relative competitiveness of different products and services would not be affected by a higher or lower tax rate (which, by the way, means that no tax harmonization is justified, for instance among the EU countries).. Similarly, those who claim that developed countries suffer from the "unfair competition" of low wage countries just fail to understand that low wages only give the corresponding countries a relative advantage in labor-intensive activities (or, rather, in activities intensive in poorly educated labor).
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Thus, we have to face a fascinating intellectual phenomenon : Nearly everyone, I believe, is able to understand the famous Ricardian "two countries-two goods" example. But many people find difficult to imagine the "n countries-m goods" case, which corresponds to the real world. However, the problem is not a problem of mathematical technics, quite the contrary : Focusing on the purely formal aspect of the Ricardian principle may prevent people from getting a deep understanding of the principle of exchange. It seems that very few people -even among professional economists -have reached this state of mind through which the understanding of the real meaning of the comparative advantage principle has been translated into an intellectual reflex which makes possible to grasp spontaneously a concrete situation by referring instinctively to the general theory of exchange.
This problem may also be made more obscure by the fact economic education too often presents the comparative advantage principle as a principle to be applied in the field of international trade and not as the general principle of exchange. As such it is given a collectivist meaning and it belongs to the realm of macroeconomics and no more to that of microeconomics. From this point of view it is characteristic that the development of the international comparative advantage principle in the History of economic thought and that of the general principle of exchange have been more or less independent one from the other. In reality, the genuine understanding of the general principle of exchange could only emerge once the theory of subjective value had been clarified by Austrian economists, which made possible to claim that exchange between two individuals (or two groups of individuals) was creating (subjective) value. To really understand the theory of exchange one must have previously understood the theory of value. Unhappily, although much students in economics have learnt the comparative advantage principle in international trade theory, they may not have a sufficient education in the theory of subjective value. Now, reducing the exchange principle to the field of international exchange has two regrettable consequences : 6 6 -It provides the principle of exchange with an abstract and purely formal character.
International trade is implicitly assumed to take place not between individuals located on different territories, but between abstract entities named "countries". As soon as one accepts an economic theory founded on a fiction, that of the nation, nothing can put a brake on the accumulation of fictitious abstract concepts. Thus, one will speak of national interest, national income, national rate of growth, etc.. And the designers of economic policy will be able to find all sorts of legitimizations for a mechanicist approach in which the maximization of subjective value by each individual will have been completely removed from the attention of economists.
-It induces people to give a relative meaning to the general principle of exchange by stressing that the comparative advantage principle has been developed by Ricardo for a given period and place. But, it is often said, a principle which could be acceptable then may not be any more valid since the conditions of production and exchange have changed. Such claims can be made only if one is making a confusion between the general principle of exchange and some specific assumptions of a specific model of international trade : As an example, Ricardo had assumed that production factors were immobile internationally and that techniques of production were different in different countries, which implies that knowledge is not internationally mobile. Such an assumption is quite acceptable since knowledge is not something which could exist independently of those who think and act : As information is costly and individuals are rationally ignorant, there is no reason for knowledge to be the same all over the world. And as exchange is not a technical phenomenon but the result of human action, it is the outcome of the processes by which individuals obtain and create information 5 . But, to be sure, quite different assumptions can be made in that respect -as the diversity of assumptions in international trade theory bears witness -without hurting in any way the validity of the general exchange principle.
It is therefore important not to miss any opportunity to restate the principle of exchange with its most general meaning, as it must be. The relative character which is too often attributed to the principle of exchange (at least in the field of However, it is also true that, quite often, people have difficulties in extending a piece of reasoning from the individual scale to a social one. They consider, more or less implicitly, that there are collective realities which are different from individual ones, that there are, for instance, national interests which have nothing in common with the individual interests of citizens. In fact, these so-called national or collective interests are nothing but the interests of the members of specific categories and they cannot logically exist independently from individual interests. Unhappily, the same people who do understand, at least from their own experience, the meaning of individual interest and the behavior of individuals are unable to accept the logical link which would allow them to understand the working of a global society. To illustrate the difficulties met by so many people in understanding the exchange principle and/or its specific application to the field of international exchange, let me just quote the following example. Paul Samuelson once said that he had been challenged a long time ago by the mathematician Stanislaw Ulam who asked him to name "one proposition in all of the social sciences which is both true and non-trivial."
It was several years later than he thought of the correct response, namely the comparative advantage principle in international trade. "That it is logically true need not be argued before a mathematician; that is is not trivial is attested by the thousands of important and intelligent men who have never been able to grasp the 8 8 doctrine for themselves or to believe it after it was explained to them." 6 Paul Samuelson was certainly not wrong in saying that the comparative advantage principle was absolutely true. But, as a good economist, he could have given the answer within a couple of seconds and not several years and he ought to quote the general principle of exchange and not its specific application to international trade.
In the present report we would mainly try to look for the reasons of this strange paradox, namely the existence of a gap between the formal understanding of the principle of exchange and the deficient understanding of both its generality and its applications. Now, if ever people do not believe in an idea which can be demonstrated as absolutely true, it is either because they are ignorant or because their reason is dominated by their passion and their interests. This may explain the gap we are analyzing in the field of international trade. As we already mentioned, globalization just means competition extended to the whole world. Now, competition -which can be defined as the possibility for any one to enter into any market as seller or buyer, i.e. as a partner in an exchange -is a demanding discipline, as is the discipline of liberty. Competition constitutes an instrument for change and changing implies efforts. It is quite understandable that people may be reluctant to accept the necessary efforts to adapt to the changes in the external world, even if they could understand the argument in favor of liberalization. It is even understandable that they prefer not to obtain the future (and uncertain) benefits of international competitition, because the cost of the present change is viewed as too high (In other words they have a strong preference for the present). However, saying that it is understandable does not mean that it is legitimate. Similarly, it is quite understandable that people demand a subsidy from the state, but it does not mean that this subsidy is legitimate. It is important to make this distinction between what is understandable and what is legitimate, because the confusion between both is 9 9 often made implicitly. It is the case whenever it is said that liberalization, although it may bring about a gain to some people in the future, may impose a present burden on others and that it is fair to take into account the loss of welfare of those who suffer from liberalization. By introducing an argument of fairness, one makes possible both to accept the general principle of exchange and to legitimate limits to its application to the real world. In other words, there would be a trade-off between an "efficiency argument" -the one which is based on the principle of exchange -and a "justice argument" -the one based on the changing welfare of different people and categories of people. We will discuss this so-called ethical argument in section III.
But, for the time being, we just want to stress that this "ethical" argument makes possible for people to reconcile in their minds two things which are in fact absolutely not compatible, namely the understanding of the principle of exchange and the defence of state-imposed limits to the freedom of exchange.
II-The belief in exceptions to the exchange principle
There are a lot of arguments against liberalization either in academic publications or in medias and political debates and we do not intend to consider all of them. How do the supporters of such critical views can make their arguments compatible with the general exchange principle ? To this end two main ways are used : First it is claimed that the exchange principle is not as general as usually stated and that it is based on some specific assumptions. By modifying them, different conclusions can be found.
Second, it is stressed that one ought to consider the existence of a trade-off between the gains from free exchange and other social targets such as employment or development.
In reality both ways are used simultaneously in order to make a plea for some protection. Such is the case with the famous infant-industry argument. This argument -which is much widely accepted -comes from the conjunction of two intellectual errors : The belief in the relative character of the comparative advantage principle and the belief in a specific ethical norm (which, as we see in section III, is not acceptable). As regards this latter one, it is commonly stated that competition cannot be fair if potential competitors are not placed in the same starting position.
Thus, when the development of a new activity is envisaged in a less developed country, it has to bear higher costs than foreign producers from more developed countries, because these latter ones have no more to bear the specific costs linked to the launching of a new activity. Thus, there is a risk that the new activity in the less developed country could not overcome these specific obstacles and bear the losses of the first period, in spite of the fact it would be profitable in the long run. Thus, the normative argument about fair competition reinforces the positive argument according to which the theory of comparative advantage would be a specific theory which would be valid only as far as one takes a static view of international trade, ignoring possible long-term changes in relative competitiveness. The apparently logical conclusion of this reasoning is that liberalization could be particularly harmful for less developed countries.
The infant-industry argument is widely held, even by people who sincerely believe they are liberal, but who think that a free society implies equality of chances. Let us not consider this normative aspect of the discussion for the time being and let us rather focus on the positive argument. A crucial point in the argument consists in stressing that an activity could be beneficial in the long-run, even if it is not in the short run. But what can be the meaning of such a statement ? Let us imagine a potential entrepreneur considering the launching of a new activity. He does know that there will be a first period -a couple of years -during which he will be loosing money because one needs time in order to build the production process, to get in touch with the market, to educate the employees, etc.. But he will decide the investment if ever the discounted value of future expected gains is higher than the discounted value of short run expected losses (and if this net discounted return is higher than in any other activity he could imagine). If not, he would loose money, which would mean that he is destroying existing wealth rather than creating new wealth (or, at least, he would earn less money than he could get in another activity which is also a waste of resources). This is true for any activity, at any time, in any place, with no exception.
Thus, saying that an activity can legitimately be protected in the short run because it would be profitable in the long run is a perfect nonsense. Protection means that one is hidding part of the costs (the short-run costs) in order to allow an activity to seem to be profitable, although it is not. But there is necessarily a cost of protection which is borne by other producers and consumers (and, as is well known in theory, the cost imposed to others through protection is higher than the gain obtained by the one who is protected). In fact, the infant-industry argument must not be viewed as an exception to the general exchange principle, but as inconsistent with it and, therefore, as unacceptable. As the exchange principle is universally true, the infantindustry argument is definitely and radically wrong. The exchange principle is true because it takes into account the necessary interdependence of all human activities :
Someone chooses an activity not because it is profitable in some absolute way, but because it is relatively more profitable than other possible activities. Someone chooses to specialize and to trade because he is relatively more efficient in the products he is producing than in the products he can get through trade. The infantindustry argument adopts a partial view of human activities and just ignores the fact that human action consists in choosing the activities which seem to be relatively more profitable. The infant-industry argument consists in falsifying the terms of human choices, creating the illusion that an activity is more profitable than it is in fact and, consequently, making other activities less profitable. Moreover, it substitutes the choice of activities by incompetent and irresponsible persons to the choice by competent and responsible persons : The process of protection does not consist in protecting all the activities of a country -since it is impossible, protection being always relative -but in protecting some activities at the expense of other activities. But this process of selection, instead of being the result of numerous decisions by a large number of people who are relatively better informed and who are interested in taking the best decisions, because they are responsible, is made by politicians and bureaucrats who cannot be better informed and who are not responsible. Thus the infant-industry argument has to be definitely abandoned, precisely because, far from being an exception to the exchange principle, it is in 12 contradiction with it, but also because it is immoral, since it shifts costs from one producer to others, by using the state power.
The infant-industry argument is particularly harmful because it may lead to a situation in which wealth-destroying activities are chosen in a country at the expense of wealth-creating activities. Thus less developed countries adopting protectionist policies under the pretext of protecting new activities may be trapped in a process of decline. Moreover, it is harmful because its very roots are defective : The idea according to which one has to restore similar conditions in countries which have followed different paths historically contains a germ of totalitarism : In order to create some equality of chances and similar production conditions, one has to rebuild History and to establish a state of affairs which is completely imaginary and which does not correspond to the concrete History of the inhabitants of a country 7 .
Similar remarks can be made about another line of reasoning which also pretends that there are exceptions to the general exchange principle. According to it, the exchange principle would have a limited scope because it assumes perfect competition and the absence of externalities which is assumed to be contrary to what exists in reality. As far as externalities exist and competition is not "perfect", the comparative advantage principle would no more be generally valid, which could justify limitations to free exchange. This view is reinforced by the fact we have already stressed, namely the fact that people frequently use the comparative advantage principle from a collective point of view and are ignorant of the individualistic foundations of it. In fact, if one considers purely inter-individual exchange, it is impossible to demonstrate that the existence of externalities or imperfect competition could limit the validity of the exchange principle : If two individuals enter voluntarily into an exchange agreement, it is because it is profitable to both or, at least, because they believe it. By deciding this agreement, they may create (positive or negative) externalities on others, but it 13 13 remains true that both benefit from the exchange. On another hand, it is certain that the traders cannot be perfectly informed and it may happen that one or the other regrets the agreement in the future, because it appears to be less profitable than it seemed to be when it was decided. But the exchange principle just states that people trade because they believe that trade is profitable for them. And as information is always "imperfect", it may happen that the real benefit is different from the expected one. But this does not imply any limit to the scope of the principle. The only human reality is necessarily a subjective one and the exchange principle rightly deals with subjective valuations, choices and gains. There is no justification for any external observer to decide about the importance of the gain obtained through trade, since he is necessarily less well informed than the concerned traders about their subjective desires. Now, those who adopt a collective approach of the comparative advantage principle and forget about individual preferences and choices believe that it is possible to define some social welfare which cannot be determined only by referring to individual welfare. Thus, if externalities exist, all individuals in a society may be satisfied with the exchange they are doing, but they may impose a cost to the collectivity, so that some exchange activities have to be limited, forbidden or taxed in order to maximize social welfare.
We just met in the field of international exchange exactly the same problems as the ones we can meet in any other field of economic theory. Therefore, it does not seem necessary to devote too much time to a debate about externalities and competition which is rather well known nowadays. We will, however, give some more thoughts to the problem of externalities in the following section from a specific point of view. For the time being, let us just point out that externalities seem to exist whenever property rights are not well defined, basically because the cost of definition seems too high in comparison with the gains which could be obtained (or because the state makes the definition of property rights impossible). In that sense, there is no real discrepancy between individual welfare and social welfare. Moreover, the idea of neo-14 14 classical economists according to which the maximization of social welfare can be obtained by voluntary exchange only to the extent that pure and perfect competition prevails, is based on a fallacious concept of competition. If competition is defined -as it ought to be -as free entry on a market, the supposed problem just disappears :
Free exchange makes possible for all individuals to maximize their welfare (so that "social welfare" is maximized), although information is not perfect, the producers of a given product are not numerous, there is a very high level of differentiation of goods, etc…To be valid, the exchange principle does not need a situation of perfect information, with a great number of producers producing the same products (once more the myth of equal conditions in different countries…), it just needs free entry on the markets. Whenever free entry and free trade are limited, for instance under the pretext of coping with externalities and imperfections in competition, individuals can no longer maximize their own welfare and get all the potentials benefits of trade.
However, such debatable ideas constitute the foundation of a modern -and, may be, dominant -approach of international trade, known under the heading of "the new theories of international trade" 8 , which may suggest that the "old theory", based on the comparative advantage principle, are no more adapted to the modern world.
As an example, it is a similar line of reasoning which is founding the popular theory of "immiserizing growth". According to this theory, it may happen that less developed countries suffer from trade liberalization because it induces a path of specialization different from the one which would have been followed in autarchy, and implying a lower rate of growth (if not a negative one). Consequently, free trade does not allow the concerned country to obtain an optimal rate of growth and protectionism is justified, contrary to what is suggested by the exchange principle. It is clear that this theory gives an apparent justification to protectionist policies as far as it is easily considered as a norm for less developed countries instead of being what it is really, namely a special theoretical case. One danger of this theory is that it is based on a counterfactual argument : It states that it may happen that liberalization causes a lower rate of growth, but one cannot know in advance which specializations would be chosen in the country either under free trade and under different possible protectionist policies. As a theory of economic policy, it is based on the pretence of knowledge.
However, this practical argument against the theory of immiserizing growth is not sufficient. In fact, one could say that, as far as it is a theoretical possibility, no matter if it is actual or not, the theory has demonstrated that there are exceptions to the exchange principle. This is why it is important to adopt a critical view vis-a-vis the theory of immiserizing growth. A full examination of the theory and its possible founding assumptions would certainly go far beyond the necessary scope of the present paper and we will limit ourself to a general overview. In order to obtain a situation of immiserizing growth, one has to introduce into a model of international trade specific assumptions according to which, due to liberalization, producers in a country are induced to adopt specializations which are less growth-enhancing that would have been the case under autarchy. These special assumptions are usually constituted by externalities, economies of scale, agglomeration effects or dynamic education effects (in fact very similar to those which are used in the theory of endogeneous growth).
Let us just take the example of agglomeration effects. It is quite true that there are cumulative effects due to agglomeration : By concentrating in the same area, people get information at a lower cost, they are closer to their markets, they benefit from a diversified labor force, etc… Thus, if free exchange prevails, not only for commodities, but also for factors of production (free migrations and free capital movements), activities will concentrate into the richest countries and the less developed countries may loose their most productive factors of production. In any case, there will be a cumulative process of growth in the more developed countries, because of the agglomeration effects, and a cumulative process of lower growth (or negative growth) in the poor country, because of declining agglomeration effects. Therefore, the rate of growth will be lower in the poor country and some protection (which one ?) would be justified in order for the country to reach a higher level of income and to be able to better benefit from agglomeration effects.
The crucial point in this theory (or this set of theories) stems from the fact it is based on a collective approach and not on an individual one. It may be true that the rate of growth be lower with liberalization. But what ? What does it mean ? What is the relation between the rate of growth and the welfare of the country's inhabitants ?
The rate of growth of a country is the rate of growth of its national income (or GNP).
But the very notion of "national income" 9 or "national product" is meaningless since the income or the product do not belong to the nation -a purely abstract concept which cannot think, act, produce and get an income -but to individuals. From an individualistic point of view, liberalization opens new opportunities. Let us assume, for instance, that, due to openess, an individual in the poor country can transfer his capital to another country and benefit from a higher return. His welfare is increased by liberalization. But from a purely quantitative -and disputable -point of view, there is less capital in the country and its rate of growth is lower. Is it legitimate to label such a situation as "immiserizing growth" ? Moreover, as far as liberalization opens new opportunities, one cannot know in advance to which extent people will take these opportunities and adapt to them. In some sense, the theory of immiserizing growth implicitly assumes that entrepreneurs are unable to invent new specializations in less developed countries, so that they stay in low-growth activities. But the problem is not a problem of openess, it is a problem of flexibility and adaptation. And once more, one cannot know in advance to which extent entrepreneurs can adjust to new situations.
It is also true that some other people in the country may suffer from liberalization because they loose a protected market. Again, from a purely quantitative point of view, this may be interpreted as a loss of growth for the country. But is that a legitimate criterion of evaluation ? We will consider this problem in the next section.
But, beforehand, let us ask the following question : Do we really need economists to create "new theories of international trade" ? In fact, principles have been known for long and they are sufficient both for an understanding of globalization and for the determination of economic policy (or, rather, to prevent any economic policy…). But the caste of professional economists have vested interests in developing these new theories. Thus, they obtain consideration, positions and money, mainly by bringing to governments apparently scientific arguments in favor of policies to "regulate" globalization.
In comparison, those who just remind others of the "old" principles may be viewed as old-fashioned, but they may be the real economists. In fact, they have mainly a negative role : Trying to convince that new theories are biased, inconsistent or arbitrary. They have to fix the breaches steadily made in the foundations of knowledge, but their role seems less glorious than inventing a new theory of international trade. In reality, in a world in which principles would be known and respected, we would need very few economists. But everyone would have to know economic reasoning.
III-The ethical argument in favor of free exchange
As in any other field of thought, in order to support or to reject liberalization, one may use arguments based on measurable criteria or more ethical arguments. A great number of economists would explicitly prefer the first ones because they favor a value-free approach of economics. However, in order to propose policy solutions, they have to choose some criterion to evaluate different situations and this choice is necessarily arbitrary. We already met an example of an approach based on measurable criteria when we discussed the meaning of the maximization of the national income. Thus, the supporters of free exchange would point out that the rate of growth of a country is maximized when exchange is not impaired and those who support state interference with international exchange would point out the possibility of immiserizing growth or would stress the infant-industry argument. One reason for such divergent views among economists -who may have had the same education in economics and who may accept the same foundations of economic theory -comes from the fact any policy measure has distribution effects. These effects are differently evaluated by different economists who surreptitiously reintroduce their own preferences and prejudices in what they pretend to be a value-free analysis.
A symptomatic example of such a drift is given by the traditional theory known as the theory of "optimal tariff" (which seems to provide one more exception to the general exchange principle, as is suggested by the term "optimal") : Protection could be profitable for a country as far as it makes possible a higher income. Why a country could be better-off with a tariff than without it ? The basic reason is that a tariff is a tax and, as is the case for any tax, there is a redistribution of the tax burden between both partners in exchange, whoever is formally paying it to the tax administration.
Under a specific conjunction of demand and supply elasticities, the authorities of one country may manage to determine the tariff rate so that the greatest part of the tax burden has to be borne by foreign producers. It may thus happen that the tax indirectly received by the protectionist state more than compensates the "social loss" incurred by the inhabitants because of protection. Now, it is clear that this tariff, although it is supposed to be "optimal" for this abstract entity, the protectionist country, is certainly not optimal for other countries : Their inhabitants have to bear the tax burden without receiving any "public good" in exchange. This is not a situation of optimality, but a situation of exploitation of foreigners by the national state. From an apparently scientific point of view, this tariff is labelled as "optimal".
From an ethical point of view, it cannot be labelled otherwise than as a robbery.
Let us consider another example concerning the internal distribution effects of protection. Let us imagine that there are two individuals in a country, A and B, and a state. B is able to obtain protection from the state, in which case he would gain 80 and A would loose 100. To prevent such an event, A may propose to pay 90 to B in order for him to abandon his project. The utilitarist would say that, in such a case, free trade will be preserved and the national wealth would be maximized. However, it remains true that B got an additional wealth at the expense of A by using the threat of a public constraint, making possible a spoliation of what A owns legitimately.
In reality there may be a normative dimension in any economic problem. Lacking a clear standard of what is valid and what is not, those who pretend that they are developing a value-free analysis are necessary led to invent some decision criteria, such as the maximization of the national income or the welfare of poor countries.
They, in fact, quite often adopt an implicit ethics, especially when their proposals imply distribution effects and they decide arbitrarily to give specifically higher weight to the welfare of such or such category (for instance the welfare of one given "country", that of farmers, wage-earners, etc..). Now, they have to be blamed not only because they are using implicit ethical arguments, but also, and mainly, because their ethical arguments are not consistent.
From this point of view, one must carefully make a distinction between two sorts of ethics : Universal ethics and personal, subjective ethics. By universal ethics we mean a system of ethical principles which could be potentially accepted by all individuals all-over the world, without any possible inconsistency (even if this ethics is not actually accepted by a more or less important part of the world population). The only ethics which can correspond to this definition is the ethics of property rights :
Whenever individual rights are defined and respected, there cannot be conflicts between individuals and any human situation can be clearly evaluated. The same is not true with personal ethics. As respectable as they may be, they are not necessarily shared by other people and there cannot be an universal agreement about some ethical criterion. Thus, according to their own personal ethics, someone may consider that the welfare of nationals is more important than everything else, another one may give the priority to poors, to farmers or to bureaucrats. All these subjective value judgments are inconsistent one with the other. The implicit value judgments 20 20 which are present in so many theories of international trade belong to this category.
They cannot provide a basis for any general explanation of the world. As such they are not scientific, contrary to what they pretend to be.
Conversely, the universal ethics of property rights provides a sound basis for a theory of exchange and, consequently, for any statement in the field of international exchange. In fact, any limit or prohibition imposed against free exchange constitutes an attack against one's rights. Those who freely agree to make an exchange do not violate the rights of anyone, but their own rights are harmed whenever their desired exchange is prohibited. It is also true that their agreement may have consequences for other people (what is called "externalities" in traditional economics), but it does not mean that it is injuring the rights of these other people. Thus, let us imagine that a grocery has settled for long in a given street and it sells to customers located in the same area. If a new grocery settles in the same street and attracts customers by selling better products at a lower price, the first one is not entitled to ask for any protection since it is not the owner of the customers and it has no rights over the newcomer. Certainly, the first grocery suffers from a "negative externality", but this externality is legitimately created.
Similarly, in the field of international exchange, if ever an activity has been protected for long in a given country, it means that the owner of this activity benefited from an illegitimate privilege, obtained through public constraint, and implying a violation of others' rights. If liberalization occurs, the rights of those who suffered from the protection are re-established. Simultaneously, the one who was protected has the feeling that a cost is imposed upon him (a negative externality).
But suppressing an undue privilege must not be interpreted as a cost imposed upon the former beneficiary. Those who pretend to prove scientifically that protection may be justified for reasons we have previously mentioned (externalities, immiserizing growth, infant-industry, etc…) are necessarily inconsistent with the logics and the ethics of property rights. If two approaches are incompatible one with the other, we have to choose one of them. As the ethics of property rights is the only possible consistent approach, it has to be preferred. The best answer which can be given to all theories arguing in favor of limits to free exchange is the one which is provided by the ethics of property rights.
IV-Concluding remarks : Strategies to support globalization
We began the present report by underlining the existence of a gap between the universally true character of the exchange principle and the numerous statementsby academics or the general public -which are not compatible with this principle.
We now have to try to answer the following question : How to fill the gap ?
The answer is not that easy. In fact, in the previous section we stressed that the defence of free exchange can ultimately be made only through an ethical approach.
Free exchange has to be defended without any exception just because it means freedom to act for individuals. Having this conviction, we believe that pragmatic arguments in favor of free exchange -for instance pointing out some link between growth and free trade -ought not to be used, just because they miss the fundamental point and/or because they cannot be universally convincing. However, the difficulty in communicating in favor of globalization, comes from the fact most people are used to these sorts of arguments and consider ethical arguments -based on the ethics of property rights -as not scientific or unacceptable, given their own ethical prejudices.
Thus, let us take the statement according to which countries which are the most open on the outside world are the most prosperous ones (or have the highest rate of growth). Such a statement can be developed with the use of the analytical tools of economics and it can be tested econometrically (with a good chance of being validated). Those who are in favor of liberalization -as is my case -are satisfied by such econometric results. Thus, it is comforting to read in the Index of Economic Freedom that there is a strong link between economic liberty -which includes freedom of international exchange -and prosperity. And I must confess that I personally use such arguments and data in order to persuade various audiences.
However, I feel uneasy when using such empirical arguments. In fact, I do not need such a proof of the benefits of free exchange, since I believe that the exchange principle is universally true and empirical tests of it do not add anything to my knowledge. And if ever some facts seemed to be contrary to this principle, I would say -because I am convinced of it -that the facts are misleading in comparison with theory and that only the theory is valid (namely the theory according to which free exchange has to be preferred to limits to exchange). I may also add that these facts are necessarily fallaciously built and measured (For instance, what is the meaning of the national income, how is it measured, what is the real value of any index used, etc..).
But a real difficulty comes from the fact that what is satisfying for me -and, I
suppose, for a significant number of academics -namely the fact that an universal theory cannot be proved to be wrong by facts -is not convincing for most people.
Therefore, we are left with the following choice : Adopting a radical attitude by reminding endlessly people of the exchange principle or accepting some compromising attitude by trying to demonstrate the benefits of free exchange. I am personally inclined to prefer the first approach, since I feel that one must express ideas the way he feels it. Moreover, if academics abandon what constitutes the specificity of their contribution to the social debate -namely the search for a general theory which makes possible to understand the working of the real world -who else will do it ? I feel it as a sort of moral duty (according to my own subjective ethics) to bring back people to principles whenever I believe they are true. We must be convinced that valuable ethical principles are the basis for a scientific approach of economic problems. Being firm on this view makes possible to better analyze and criticize theories which are apparently scientific, but which in fact are fallacious and inconsistent.
However, one may say, there is a practical problem to be solved : The problem of globalization is not only an academic problem and it is not sufficient to try to convince academics. It is a practical and urgent problem, specially if one considers the influence of anti-globalization movements all over the world. This is certainly 23 23 true, but it does not introduce any weakening in the belief we just expressed, for two reasons.
First, academics have a "natural" specialization in communicating with other academics and even if they have the opportunity to address other audiences, they have a comparative advantage in academic communication. And other people, who had been educated by academics and had learnt the good principles, will be able to address these other audiences.
Second, I am also convinced that the ethics of property rights, as far as it corresponds to a correct view of human relations, can be understood well beyond the limits of the academic world, possibly expressed in simple words and clear statements.
These intellectual efforts are certainly not sufficient since, as we already stressed, opponents to globalization are successful because ignorance and interests are at work. Strategies and marketing tools may be invented to overcome the hostility of specific interests to globalization. But let us give what we can best give to others :
The force of our convictions and reasoning.
